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Abstract As an effective alternative approach to provide
goods and services for public infrastructure, the Public
Private Partnership (PPP) has been studied extensively over
the past few decades. On a global scale, China and the
United States have developed cooperation on PPP projects
in various areas. To perform a comparative study, this
paper analyzes how PPP projects work in both countries for
public transportation. The basic features, types, and phases
of PPPs in public transportation are introduced first, fol-
lowed by a thorough discussion on their advantages and
challenges. This paper adopts a case study method to
analyze the achievements and problems of PPP projects in
both countries and then proposes important findings and
suggestions for future research.
Keywords Public private partnership  Public
transportation  China  USA
1 Introduction
Governments and the private sector deliver goods and ser-
vices with different methods, where they share responsibil-
ities and claim rights in various degrees. Samuelson [1]
noted that public service provision does not necessarily
imply that the government is also the producer of the ser-
vices. In fact, the private sector has been involved in the
service delivery for decades. In the early 1990s, Public
Private Partnerships (PPP) projects were first launched in the
U.K. on toll-road concessions. After these first experiments
in the U.K., PPPs have been growing in popularity as an
effective alternative instrument for the provision of goods
and services by governments, especially in the infrastructure
industry for both developed and developing countries, such
as Greece [2], Poland [3], Indian [4], and Ghana [5].
In China, with markets opening up for public facilities
and services at the end of 1980s, growth in the number of
PPPs in infrastructure has increased fast. For example, since
late 1990s, the number of expressways under PPP contracts,
programmed in the Chinese National Expressway Network
Plan (The 7918 Plan), has increased from 0 to 122 PPP
contracts at present [6]. Such a rapid growth was the result
of the gap between public funding and actual project costs.
Governments were hoping to seek more funding from pri-
vate sector and meanwhile reallocate responsibilities of
design, construction, operation, and maintenance by means
of PPPs. At the same time, the trend towards PPPs in the
provision and maintenance of infrastructure projects in the
United States has been increasing mildly due to the strengths
of financial and institutional arrangements that support the
traditional procurement across the country. However, as the
U.S. infrastructure system matured, the needs for repairing
and expanding urban networks of roads, bridges, and tunnels







1 School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Cornell
University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
2 Department of City and Regional Planning, Cornell
University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
3 Department of Civil, Construction, & Environmental
Engineering, San Diego State University, San Diego,
CA 92182, USA
123
J. Mod. Transport. (2016) 24(3):215–223
DOI 10.1007/s40534-016-0105-7
of traditional procurement. This has led to an increasing
willingness by infrastructure agencies at each government
level to consider and in some cases apply alternative struc-
tures of public service delivery, including financing, contract
delivery, and life-cycle preservation methods to leverage the
scarce public resources.
As two of the world’s largest economics, China and the
United States have developed cooperation on many PPP
projects in various industrial and technology fields, such as
electricity production and transmission [7], and the project
of building high-speed railway between China and US is
currently being considered [8]. Although there is much
literature on PPP practices in China (e.g., [9, 10]), and
more researchers in the United State are paying attention to
this delivery method, less work has been done to investi-
gate how PPP works differently in these two countries.
Since public transportation is a major contributor to the
economy in both countries, a comparative study on relevant
PPP projects will lead to potential benefits. This paper
focuses to fill such a research gap.
2 Features of PPPs
2.1 Attributes of PPPs compared with public
provision and privatization
Definitions of PPPs vary broadly in the literature depending
on the specific backgrounds of countries and regions as
well as different research interests. Most definitions high-
light the unique features of PPPs that distinguish it from
public provision, privatization, or both (e.g., [11–13]). As
defined by Federal Highway Administration [14],
A public–private partnership is a contractual agree-
ment formed between public and private sector part-
ners, which allows more private sector participation
than is traditional. The agreements usually involve a
government agency contracting with a private com-
pany to renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and/or
manage a facility or system. While the public sector
usually retains ownership in the facility or system, the
private party will be given additional decision rights in
determining how the project or task will be completed.
This definition emphasizes that in a PPP structure the
public and private sectors share responsibility for the
delivery of the project and/or its life-cycle services.
PPPs usually incorporate a long-term contractual rela-
tionship between public and private sectors, as against to
the short-term procurement in traditional public provision.
Another essence of PPPs is the substantial role of gov-
ernment by either the eventual ownership or the life-cycle
supervision, as against to the result of privatization. The
purpose of introducing PPPs in between public provision
and privatization is to deliver public services with more
competent resources aggregation and risk allocation.
Traditional public provision separates the construction
phase from the sequent operation and maintenance (O&M)
phase by only purchasing the construction service from the
private firms. This procurement structure often leads to
insufficient O&M and service deterioration in the long term.
In addition, political pressure incentivizes governments to
prefer introducing new projects to the O&Mphase of existing
projects. For these reasons, PPPs offer a viable alternative, in
that the private sector is responsible for not only asset delivery
but also overall project management and successful operation
over the contract life [15]. Since returns of investment for
private sector depend on long-term project performance than
bundling the construction andO&Mphases, service providers
will seek efficient resource allocation to reduce life-cycle
costs. Figure 1 summarizes key differences between PPPs
and traditional procurement methods.
Privatization, referring to the shift of government
functions from a public sector to the private agency, is also
an alternative of service delivery [16]. In most cases pri-
vatization and contracting out are often used synonymously
[17], but ‘‘contracting out’’ tends to indicate some parts of
services being transferred to a number of private firms.
Privatization has the potential to take more advantage of
market competition. However, when certain services
demonstrate increasing return and natural monopoly, or
when they are not excludable and the society insists not to
charge users, privatization does not work well for achiev-
ing users’ welfare [13]. Transportation infrastructure pro-
jects demonstrate such features, thus require strong
network planning and substantial roles government during
the entire process. Meanwhile, the quality of transportation
infrastructure is more contractible than that of education or
health care, making it qualified for the application of PPPs.
2.2 Various types of PPPs
PPP projects can be structured either ‘‘vertical’’ or ‘‘hori-
zontal’’ in nature [18], which are also referred to ‘‘contrac-
tual’’ and ‘‘institutional,’’ respectively. In a vertical
partnership, a concession agreement or PPP contract assigns
the responsibility of service delivery to the private sector
over its entire life cycle (i.e., ‘‘design, build, finance and
operate’’), and transfers the service to public control at the
end. In a horizontal partnership, both public and private
sectors are responsible for providing infrastructure services
as shareholders in a special purpose vehicle (SPV), in which
public and private shares are jointly ventured for the project
purpose. In contrast to the temporary and limited nature of
vertical partnership, the horizontal partnership transfers
ownership and operating function to the joint venture
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permanently. In extreme cases, government may hold no
equity in the joint venture, but participate in the PPPs as a
bond issuer or supervisor. Figure 2 demonstrates the dif-
ferent structures of vertical and horizontal partnerships.
In practice, PPPs take on many different forms that are
typically known by acronyms. Most vertical PPPs are regar-
ded as the variants of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), indi-
cating that the private sector is responsible for building and
operating specific facilities or services during a relatively long
term, and eventually transfers the facility to the public sector.
BOTs allow sufficient time for the private sector to internalize
life-cycle cost and get returns on investment from fees
charged to the government [19]. To mitigate the risk of
overestimated demand, BOTs usually ask limited access to
private capital, which means governments hold more finan-
cial responsibility and bears the equity risk.
A major variation of the BOT is build-own-operate-
transfer (BOOT), also known as design-build-finance-operate
(DBFO), involving significant finance from the private sector.
In this structure, private firms maintain ownership until
transfer it to the government, during which they are able to
charge user fees and assume most equity risks. BOOTs are
most suitable when the public sector faces a large financial
gap or is not able to bear the financial risks [20].
3 Promises and challenges of PPPs in public
infrastructure
The PPP gains the popularity in the infrastructure industry
over recent years for its promises to allocate resources
more efficiently and mitigate risk more effectively. The
Fig. 1 Differences between PPP approaches and the traditional practice
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most highlighted advantage is the enhancement of ‘‘value
for money’’ (VfM), meaning delivering specific facility or
service with the same quality at a cost lower than con-
ventional procurement or spending the same amount of
money while gaining a better service quality [21]. Walker
and Smith [22] argued that the private sector possesses
better mobility than the public sector and is more capable
to raise massive funds for the large-scale infrastructure
projects. This is doubtful because the involvement of pri-
vate firms does not intrinsically generate revenue or lower
the cost of capital. The economic gains from PPP structure
derive largely from the bundling of construction and O&M,
minimizing the life-cycle cost and preventing government
from obtrusively starting new projects rather than main-
taining existing ones. Secondly, competition for the con-
tract will lead to the pricing more economically viable than
the inefficient user fees in public provision under political
pressure. In addition, the private sector knows how to
charge the premium that matches the risks they bear. Other
reasons supporting PPPs include the innovation brought by
private firms and the on-time service delivery incentivized
by economic gains.
Ideally, most advantages mentioned above can also be
realized in a competitive market, but considering the
increasing return to scale and thus the natural monopoly in
most transportation infrastructures, a long-term public role
to conduct network planning and regulation is indispens-
able. The urban railway network that will be discussed in
the following section is one of the most salient examples.
Since the quality of transportation service is relatively
contractible, the public sector could partner with the pri-
vate sector for enhancing completion but meanwhile retain
long-term regulation and eventual ownership to avoid the
loss of users’ welfare. For these reasons, whether the cost is
covered by user fees or government transferring payment,
PPPs in the arena of transportation win both complete
privatization and traditional procurement.
Besides the promise of integrating resources more effi-
ciently, the PPP becomes preferable because of its vision of
allocating risks to the parties that are best able to manage
them. Risk management is a dynamic process over the life
cycle of the project, which can be broken down into the
identification, assessment, and mitigation of risks through
optimal allocation between public and private sectors.
Comparing to traditional procurement, one of the major
risks of public infrastructure, the unavailability risk, is
borne by private firms instead of public users under PPPs.
On the other hand, each sector will assume risks with
Fig. 2 Structures of horizontal & vertical partnerships
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corresponding benefit claim. For example, lenders will ask
for higher risk premiums if the private sector need to bears
demand risk (i.e., collecting availability payment rather
than user fee). Table 1 lists typical categories of risk
management.
It is worth noting that the advantages of PPP structure do
not guarantee the promises of PPP projects. Instead, there
are certain preconditions to apply PPPs and a number of
shortcomings that often impede the success of PPPs. Given
that competitive auction can only be achieved when real
competition exists for the contract [23], any institutional or
financial barriers that inhibit competitions could become
challenging for PPPs, including but not limited to weak
protection of property rights, incapable budgetary control
and incompetent financial market.
The more intrinsic shortcoming of PPPs is the high
transaction cost during long-term contractual relationship.
A lengthy bidding process in PPPs could impose high
contracting cost at the beginning, which is the reason why
many countries impose a threshold or value to select pro-
jects qualified for PPPs. Moreover, since the contract is not
likely to be perfectly detailed, there is room for oppor-
tunistic renegotiation, which could enable the public and
private sectors to take advantages of each other’s efforts.
For example, Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer [24] noticed that
governments in the transportation sector often bail out
concessionaires. Table 2 depicts typical steps of a vertical
PPP project. If each sector is not bear the full responsibility
of its own actions, such renegotiation is likely to cause
inefficient lobbying and even corruption.
In sum, if the cost of renegotiation negates the efficient
gain, or if the speculation by any partner could escape the
penalty under an unsupportive institutional and finical
environment, PPPs may not be the best option for trans-
portation infrastructure projects.
4 PPP applications of publication transportation
in China and the USA
Growing demand for mobility has created serious traffic
congestion and deteriorating air quality in urban areas. This
has encouraged huge investments in the viable public
transport infrastructure, such as subway systems, as alter-
natives to car travel. Many large transport infrastructure
projects used to be financed by the government directly,
but the financial burden far exceeds the availability of
public funds. This section focuses on analyzing PPP public
transportation projects in between both China and the
United States using the method of case study.
Table 1 Typical categories of risk management
Risk categories Stages of the project Allocation of risk
Land acquisition Development phase Public/private party
Delays in project Development Development phase Private party
Design risk
Planning risk
Project completion risk Construction phase Private party
Project cost risk/cost overruns Construction phase Private party
Technology risk Construction/operation Phase Private party
Regulatory & administrative risk Operation phase Public/private party
Commercial risk Operation phase Private party
Operations & maintenance risk Operation phase Private party
Financial risk Operation period Private party
Interest rate risk
Foreign exchange exposure risk
Tax rate change risk
Inflation risk
Termination risk Operations phase Private party
Insolvency and outside editor risk Throughout project life cycle Private party
Environmental risk Construction/operations Phase Public/private party
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4.1 Beijing No. 4 subway line
Beijing No. 4 subway line is a 17.4-mile project, which runs
through the north and south of the city passing by many
central business districts and universities [25]. This is the
first project adopting PPP delivery approach in Chinese
metropolitan railway system. This line is regarded as the
‘‘Golden Line’’ by Beijingmunicipal government, and it was
partially opened in time for the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
In 2004 after the proposal of allowing investments from
outside Chinese mainland was approved by the State
Development of Reform Commission, the Beijing munic-
ipal government opened up participation in the building
and operation of Beijing No. 4 subway line to domestic and
foreign companies. Three private players won the contract
after a competitive process, in which only a small number
of prequalified bidders were invited to take part. These
three companies are Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway
Corporation (MTR), Beijing Capital Group (BCG) and
Beijing Infrastructure Investment Corporation Ltd (BIIC).
The former one is a private company from Hong Kong and
the others are state-owned.
The signed contract covers a period of 30 years, with the
initial 4 years reserved for construction and the rest for
operation. The project is divided into two parts (part A and
B) according to the characteristics of construction mis-
sions. Part A involves civil engineering and physical
infrastructure of the project (e.g., earthwork, tunnels and
stations), with an investment about USD 1.5 billion (70 %
of the total expenses) paid by the Beijing municipal gov-
ernment (through the No. 4 Beijing Subway Line Invest-
ment Company). Part B covers the operational aspects
(e.g., vehicles, ticket machines, signaling systems, air-
conditioning, fire protection, escalators, elevators, control
devices, and power supply facilities), and represents the
30 % of the total expenses [26]. It is privately funded and
managed by a SPV, in which the shares of MTR, BCG, and
BIIC are 49 %, 49 %, 2 %, respectively, functioning as
partners in a regular BOT project [27, 28]. The No. 4
subway line will be transferred back to the Beijing gov-
ernment by 2039. Figure 3 illustrates the joint venture
structure and investment agreement of the project.
There was also an asset lease agreement between the
No. 4 Beijing Subway Line Investment Company and
MTR-BCG allowing the latter to use the infrastructure.
During the concession period, MTR-BCG would obtain
revenues from ticket fares and the commercial operation of
the subway stations. Besides monitoring assets, quality,
and safety management, BIIC also plays a role in guaran-
teeing a certain level of profits for MTR-BCG. Besides
subsidy on ticket fares, BIIC promised to make up the
difference if the annual revenue is less than 70 % of the
projected level, while if it is higher, the exceed part will be
absorbed by the equity investors National Development
and Reform Commission [26]. In reality, annual ridership
of 4th subway has constantly exceeded the predicted level
by more than 10 %, generating considerable profit for
investors. Since there is no upper limit of revenue gains in
the contract, 4th subway faces critics of leaving too much
profit to the private sector.
There are many factors driving the operation of this
project. First, it is a product under the investment system
reform led by the central government. Second, it helps the
Beijing municipal government to avoid raising large
amount upfront cost in a short term. Last but not least, the
intense interaction between different partners has resulted
in an environment where mutual learning on technical,
management, and economic aspects can flourish, leaving
experiences on how to share risks and revenues among
public and private stakeholders. In order to govern the PPP
activity of Beijing’s 4th subway line, the municipal gov-
ernment had to issue several supplementary documents,
including ‘‘Regulations on Developing Urban Infrastruc-
ture with PPPs Arrangement,’’ proving that certain insti-
tutional environment is necessary to promote PPPs. On the
other hand, such amount of efforts led to 18-month nego-
tiation preceding the final contract, which inevitably
caused the high transaction costs. Although this cost of
time is common in well-designed PPP projects, some
government officials may not choose PPPs if they have to
delivery public services faster.
Table 2 Typical steps of a vertical PPP project
Phase I: Project Identification & Early Consideration
Assessment of need, economic & financial feasibility
PPP test
Phase II: Preparation & Project Approval
Development of PPP delivery method
Development of traditional delivery method
Efficiency comparison test (Value for Money test)
Phase III: Project Delivery & Contract Award
Preparation and prequalification
Negotiation process
Selection based on criteria
Contract award and closing the deal
Phase IV: Project Implementation & Contract Management
Construction and Operation
Performance control by the government
Phase V: Contract Termination
Transfer
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4.2 Las Vegas Monorail
The Las Vegas Monorail is a 3.9-mile rail transit system
located in Clark County, Nevada, connecting major hotels
and casinos along the world famous Las Vegas Strip. It was
built on an existing free monorail jointly owned by MGM
Grand and Bally’s Monorail. LLC. The tourist growth
stimulated the expansion from the original 1-mile system to
the current Las Vegas Monorail to satisfy the increasing
transportation demand.
In 1997 the State of Nevada passed legislation for the
expansion plan to allow a private company to own, operate,
and charge a fare as a public monorail system. Later the
non-profit corporation, Las Vegas Monorail Company
(LVMC), was formed in 2000. LVMC gained a 50-year
contract with the original developer, and signed an agree-
ment with Transit Systems Management LLC (BOO part-
ner), for the construction, operation, and management of
the project. Different from most public transportation PPPs,
the government does not own a share in the venture, nor
does the private sector transfer the project to the govern-
ment. Instead, the public sector participating in this
unconventional PPP by providing policy supports.
The primary funding resource of Las Vegas Monorail
project is the tax-exempt revenue bonds issued by the
State, with further user fares and advertisement to fulfill the
debt service. Salomon Smith Barney and the Nevada
Department of Business and Industry issued revenue bonds,
and LVMC would pay the expenses of operations and
maintenance after receiving the bonds. It is worth noting
that the State of Nevada was only responsible for bond
issuing, and most construction costs were funded by the
private sector without government investment, guarantee,
or subsidy [29]. As pointed out by the Federal Highway
Administration [30], one major innovation in financing
arrangement of this project is that the LVMC is the first and
only privately owned public transportation systems in the
U.S. and operates with no public subsidies. This innovative
funding solution using PPP also promoted the development
of monorail technology. For example, Las Vegas Monorail
is the nation’s first fully automated, line haul electric transit
system with zero emissions. In 2009 only, tourists who
rode the Monorail helped reduce emissions by more than
48 tons of carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds
and nitrogen oxides over the course of the year by saving
about 2.7 million vehicle miles [31].
Fig. 3 Joint venture structure in Beijing No. 4 subway line
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When this PPP project was being implemented, many
difficulties have been overcome such as overruns, schedule
delays, mechanical failures, and legislation. However, due
to inaccurate ridership prediction, LVMC filed for bank-
ruptcy protection in January 2010 when it became unable
to pay debt service on the bonds and its other expenses
[32]. Following by the recovery of the entire project, the
ticket fee of Las Vegas Monorail is now at least double
than most metropolitan cities in the U.S.
5 Discussion
Although public private partnerships have different devel-
opment paths in China and the United States, valuable
lessons learnt from these two typical cases in public
transportation infrastructure will help understanding the
contexts of conducting PPPs in these two countries.
First of all, how the government plays its role is crucial
for implementing the PPPs. On the one hand, local gov-
ernments should fully respect the agreements and give
considerable freedom to private partners. One counterex-
ample is that the second-largest shareholder of Beijing No.
4 subway line, Zhiqiang Ren, has recently complained
about the government’s arbitrary decision makings
including pricing, investment, and line extension, which
led his investment to be a ‘‘generous donation’’ [33]. On
the other hand, the lack of the ability for the local gov-
ernment to conduct proper risk analysis and negotiate with
private parities inhibits the development of PPPs. Las
Vegas Monorail’s filing bankruptcy demonstrates the
challenges too limited involvement of the government (i.e.,
the State of Nevada) on the PPP project. The role of the
public sector is typically defined by the PPP agreement;
thus the core task is to keep the resource allocation and risk
taking balanced so that both sectors are able to maximize
their capacities [34]. From a financial point of view, before
an attempt secure equity financing or debt, it is important
for PPPs to have an equitable risk-sharing system.
Second, efficiency and innovation should be sought
before funding PPPs. Up to now, most contributions from
the private sector have been financed by short-term bank
loans, often with the backup from the local governments.
However, a bottleneck is caused by the lack of financing
sources in future PPP infrastructure developments with the
large scale of investment required and the limited guaran-
teeing capacity of local governments under new regulations.
One important alternative is infrastructure bonds, which
have been used for years in China and the United States. For
example, Beijing recently raised $1 billion bonds for the
development of Beijing metro system in three-year and five-
year notes [35]. Another possible alternative to enlarge the
investing base is to create opportunities for pension funds
and insurance companies to invest in infrastructure funds on
a long-term basis. The project of Las Vegas Monorail has
made some innovative achievements by introducing the
entirely private-owned public transportation systems.
Besides bringing in innovation in project finance, patterning
with the private party under a PPP agreement will also attract
advanced technology, which make the services sustainable
for public purposes [36].
Third, an effective evaluation and renegotiation system
shall be developed. If a PPP is considered as an approach of
accessing financing only, the chances of failure will be
increased because of a high risk of choosing inappropriate
projects (also known as ‘‘white elephants’’). The core cri-
terion while selecting and designing a project is whether it
will bring value for money, which is termed VfM analysis.
In the context of PPPs, such analysis is conducted to decide
whether it would be eventually more beneficial to the
public users [30, 37]. If a PPP project does not enhance
social benefit, the public sector needs to consider renego-
tiation the contract or choose other delivery methods.
6 Conclusions
The public private partnership (PPP) model offers signifi-
cant advantages over traditional public procurement in
terms of efficiency, service quality, and value for money.
The main factor that drives PPPs’ prosperity in many
counties is the long-term capacity of project finance
brought by the private sector, which works along with
government supervision and network planning.
Government agencies and companies in the U.S. and
China have been collaborating on PPP projects in the area
of energy and climate; however, few research studies have
been conducted to analyze the difference of PPPs appli-
cations in both countries. Since transportation is the major
application of PPP all over the world, China and the United
States have huge potentials for exploring cooperation
opportunities on transportation infrastructure projects.
Among the discussions about promises and challenges of
PPPs, public transportation system, especially urban rail
system, differs from other infrastructure such as bridges or
highway in that: (1) it is more dependent on network plan-
ning and coordination at municipal level; (2) the upfront cost
such projects takes a larger part of life-cycle cost; (3) to
reach a socially optimal scale of service, government has to
restrict the level of the user fee, which usually requires
government support to sustain the cash flow.
Two typical PPP cases in China and the United States, the
Beijing No. 4 subway line and Las Vegas Monorail
respectively, are selected for discussion. With analysis of
their different PPP structures, valuable suggestions are
proposed from the case study that more attention should be
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given to the roles of governments during the long-term
partnership. Governments need to take discreet supporting
and supervising steps of promoting diversity of finance,
encouraging innovation of skills and technologies, and cre-
ating responsible evaluations. Future research could focus on
more recent projects using PPP approach in China and the
United State within the field of public transportation, com-
paring their financing mechanism and institutional systems.
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